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Questions and the Meaning of Identity Sentences
Introduction: Importance of Identity Sentences
This article explicates the meaning of identity sentences, which have special importance for 
the following reasons. First, to understand an utterance, we must understand the question it 
answers; this is because the meaning of the same sentence could change if it were uttered in 
response to a different question.1 A question that elicits an answer will be called a “correlative 
question”. The sentence can have different focus points, which constitute answers to different 
correlative questions. For example, “He went to Osaka yesterday,” can be an answer to, “Who 
went to Osaka yesterday?”, “When did he go to Osaka?”, or, “Where did he go yesterday?” 
The focus points of these sentences would likely differ; for instance, “[He]F went to Osaka 
yesterday,” “He went to [Osaka]F yesterday,” or, “He went to Osaka [yesterday]F” would be 
answers to these respective questions.
In many cases, the differences in the focus points of a sentence do not influence the 
truth value of that sentence2. However, when the relationships between these questions and 
answers are made explicit, we can see that the differences in their focus points do influence 
how to prove or verify them. Consider the following identity sentences:
“The person who went to Osaka yesterday = he,” 
“The place to which he went yesterday = Osaka”
“The day when he went to Osaka = yesterday”
Second, if we make the question-answer relationship explicit, it constructs an identity 
sentence, as in these examples. These sentences involve different methods of verification or 
proof, and the meaning of these utterances is clarified when they are rephrased in this way. 
Indeed, it is the question-answer relationship that determines the focus point of the answer. 
Even an utterance that was not intended to answer a question can be understood as a response 
1 Cf. Yukio Irie, ‘A Proof of Collingwood’s Thesis,’ in Philosophia Osaka, Nr. 4, Published by 
Philosophy and History of Philosophy / Studies on Modern Thought and Culture Division of Studies on 
Cultural Forms, Graduate School of Letters, Osaka University, pp. 69-83, 2009. http://ir.library.osaka-u.
ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/11094/10747/1/po_04_069.pdf
2 A difference in the focus point of a sentence changes the truth value of the sentence in some cases. 
Cf. Rooth, Mats, ‘A theory of focus interpretation’. Natural Language Semantics,1, 1992. pp. 75-
116. Manfred Krifka, ‘Association with focus phrases,’ in Valerie Molnar and Susanne Winkler, The 
Architecture of Focus, Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006, pp. 105-136. 
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to a correlative question insofar as it has a focus point. Moreover, as all utterances have 
a focus point, we can rephrase all of them into identity sentences, and the meaning of an 
utterance can be clarified by so doing. Therefore, the meaning of any given utterance can be 
clarified by rephrasing it into an identity sentence”)3
An answer to a question is an identity sentence in some cases, but it is not an identity 
sentence in many other cases. In the latter, the focus point provides information, and we can 
place this point on the right side of the sentence, change the remainder into a noun phrase, 
and move that to the left side to get an identity sentence. This means changing the original 
question into a question with the following form: “What is…?” A question in the form of 
“What is A?” is seeking the referent of A, and the answer to it provides it in the form of “B”; 
thus, “A = B” holds. To understand utterance “B” as an answer to “A = ?” is to understand “A 
= B”. To understand an utterance as an answer to some question is to understand the identity 
sentence. In reverse, to understand “A = B” is to understand that “B” is an answer to “A = ?”
1 Language learning by questioning and answering
As Chomsky points out, we can create an infinite number of new sentences because it is 
possible to compose an infinite number of sentences with a finite number of words. Robert 
Brandom claims that the meaning of a sentence is the minimal unit of linguistic meaning, 
and the meanings of words can be derived by analyzing and abstracting the meanings of 
sentences. The meaning of a sentence can be composed of the meanings of words that are 
derived in this way.
How do these two processes relate to each other? In many cases, an infant starts to speak 
by using one-word sentences and then produces two-word sentences by combining words. In 
a strict sense, because it performs a speech act, a one-word sentence is not an utterance of a 
word but a sentence. For example, we can understand that the one-word sentence, “Milk!”, 
conveys the meaning, “Give me milk!” In this case, an infant would not use “Milk!” as a 
short form of “Give me milk!” because she could not yet say the latter. However, when she 
says “Milk!”, she is expressing the same intention that is behind, “Give me milk!” Although 
she cannot yet say, “Give me milk!”, she can understand utterances by others, such as “Give 
me milk!” or “Do you want milk?” However, if she says the aforementioned multi-word 
sentences, it would be only a recitation of a memory of hearing such utterances. 
3 Cf. Yukio Irie, ‘Identity Sentences as Answers to Question’ in Philosophia Osaka, Nr. 7, Published 
by Philosophy and History of Philosophy / Studies on Modern Thought and Culture Division of Studies 
on Cultural Forms, Graduate School of Letters, Osaka University, 2012/3, pp. 79-94. http://ir.library.
osaka-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/11094/23292/1/po_07-079.pdf. 
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If we can understand a one-word sentence in such way, then the infant is not using it as 
an abridged form of, “Give me milk!” because it is understood that it is part of a sentence.
We learn a word as a part of a sentence (i.e., an initially subsentential expression). We 
do not learn the meaning of a word by learning sentences and analyzing them into words, 
and we do not learn to compose a sentence after learning single words. We initially learn the 
meanings and uses of words as subsentential expressions. This involves neither semantic 
atomism nor starting with learning the uses of sentences. Indeed, we need to use questions 
and answers to learn how to use subsentential expressions and sentences. Such questioning 
and answering is also a process by which we learn about questioning and answering per se. 
Indeed, the whole process of learning a language can be understood as a process of learning 
to question and answer.
The distinction between a sentence and a subsentential expression does not arise after 
learning a sentence; it starts implicitly at the beginning of learning a language. This raises the 
issue of how this distinction becomes explicit.
2  Distinction between predicate expressions and other subsentential expressions in 
terms of the question-answer relationship 
We can substitute an interrogative for a subsentential expression of a given sentence and, 
if necessary, change the order of words and form a wh-question. When we answer such a 
question, we use a subsentential expression. As explained above, the separation of a sentence 
into subsentential expressions is learned simultaneously with learning a language.
The composition of a sentence of subsentential expressions requires not only combining 
the meanings of subsentential expressions but also integrating them into a unit. 
Davidson views the issue of how to create this unification as part of the “problem of 
predication”.4 He tries to solve this problem with Tarski’s concept of “satisfaction”. Robert 
Brandom claims that a sentence, not a word, is the basic unit of linguistic meaning because 
a speech act can be performed by an utterance of a sentence but not of words. I would like to 
claim further that the unification of subsentential expressions into a sentence requires that the 
sentence can constitute an answer to a question; this is because utterance of a sentence can 
have truth value and constitute a speech act by virtue of being an answer to a question.
A wh-question is an open sentence that closes when an answer is uttered. The question 
part of a wh-question is called an incomplete utterance or half-finished product. A question 
has no truth value and does not constitute a normal speech act. The illocutionary act of posing 
4 Cf. Donald Davidson, Truth and Predication, Harvard UP, 2005 and R. Brandom, Articulating 
Reasons, Chap. 4. 
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a question is an act of requiring a normal speech act, such as an assertion, order, or promise.5 
An answer fills a void in a wh-question; thus, the answer transforms an utterance into one 
with truth value that constitutes a normal speech act. A sentence can unite subsentential 
words by serving as an answer to a question.
An answer to a question can be conceptualized in two ways. First, it can be restricted to 
only a noun or noun phrase that becomes a complete sentence by adding an expression that 
was contained in the question. Second, an answer can be the complete sentence itself, which 
is rare because individuals tend to omit an expression that was already included in a question. 
However, a predicative expression in a complete answer sentence always appears in the 
question. This is the case, even in the following example:
“What did you do yesterday?”; “I prepared for the examination.”
The “prepared” in the answer is a part of the predication. However, the “do” in the question 
is the fundamental part of the predication. Therefore, one can answer the question with a 
noun phrase, “Preparation for the examination” instead of, “I prepared for the examination,” 
because we can eliminate the part of the predication that was already included in the 
question. This question and answer construct the following identity sentence.
“What will I do tomorrow = the preparation for the examination”
The distinction between the fundamental part of a predication and the other parts can be seen 
in the relationship between a question and an answer. The relationship between a question 
and an answer is impossible without a distinction between the predicative part and other parts 
of a sentence; this is because a question is directed not at a predicative part but only at a part 
of a noun phrase.
Why does the part that belongs to the predication in the complete answer sentence always 
appear in the question? For a question to be possible it needs to direct the answerer to what 
constitutes an answer. That is, the question must specify what an answer should include. The 
necessary content of an answer cannot be provided by a predicative expression; it must be 
supplied by a noun phrase; this is because a predicative expression does not refer to anything. 
Therefore, the predicative expression should be included in the question.
5 Cf. Yukio Irie, ‘Illocutionary Acts from the Perspective of Questions and Answers,’ in Philosophia 
Osaka, Nr. 10, Published by Philosophy and History of Philosophy / Studies on Modern 
Thought and Culture Division of Studies on Cultural Forms, Graduate School of Letters, 
Osaka University, 2014/3, pp. 39-48.  https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/38248101.pdf
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Additionally, a wh-question and its answer can be paraphrased as a question and the 
answer that constitutes an identity sentence.6 Therefore, a wh-question and its answer 
generally take the following form:
“Which is A?” ; “B” (“A = B” is a complete answer sentence).
The subsentential expression that is uttered as an answer constructs a part of the complete 
answer sentence. As an answer, the subsentential expression is a noun phrase, and the 
predicative expression of the complete answer sentence is always included in the question. In 
the next section, we explain the meaning of an identity sentence. 
3 Distinction between the semantic content and the referent 
(1)  Asymmetry of an identity sentence in the context of the question-answer relationship.
The particular meaning of identity sentences that warrants attention in the context of this 
discussion is that which involves a complete answer sentence to a question. Let us consider 
the following example.
Let us suppose that two individuals enter a parking lot and one asks, “Which car belongs 
to X?”, and the other answers, “That red car.” The questioner knows that the identity sentence 
“the car that belongs to X = that red car” holds. In this case, the questioner understands 
the identity utterance in the following way: She wants to know the referent of “the car 
that belongs to X”. She refers to the referent with “the car that belongs to X” but does not 
know to which car it refers. Let us suppose that she knows X, knows that X has a car, and 
knows that the car is in the parking lot. She can understand the referent of “That red car.” 
She can know, through this answer, that the car that belongs to X = that red car. In this case, 
the questioner does not independently interpret each referent of each noun phrase on each 
side of the sentence and knows the identity of the referent. The questioner initially refers to 
“That red car”, then knows that the referent of “That red car” is the same as the referent of 
“the car that belongs to X = that red car because “That red car” was uttered as an answer to 
the question. The questioner gets to know the referent of one noun phrase through it being 
the same as the referent of the other noun phrase. Therefore, understanding of the identity 
6 A why-question is exceptional, because the answer to wh-question “Why is P?” takes a form such as 
“Because…, therefore P,” and this form constitutes an inference whose conclusion is P. I would like to 
improve this point in my paper ‘Identity Sentences as Answers to Questions’ (in Philosophia Osaka, 
Nr. 7, Published by Philosophy and History of Philosophy / Studies on Modern Thought and Culture 
Division of Studies on Cultural Forms, Graduate School of Letters, Osaka University, 2012/3, pp. 79-
94: http://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/11094/23292/1/po_07-079.pdf.) .
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sentence is asymmetric for the questioner. It is asymmetric also for the answerer because the 
answerer initially gets to know the referent of “the car belonging to X” and, to refer it to the 
questioner, thinks about the other noun phrase as a coreferential expression.
(2)  Distinction between the semantic content and referent of a noun phrase in terms of 
the question-answer relationship.
Here, the questioner asks an answerer to refer to the car belonging to X. To do so, the 
answerer must understand to what the questioner is referring. To this end, the questioner uses 
the expression. “The car that belongs to X.” She does not know its referent, but she does 
know its semantic content. The answerer uses a different expression, “That red car” to refer 
to the object. “The car that belongs to X,” and, “That red car,” are coreferential expressions. 
For the questioner to grasp the referent of “The car that belongs to X” the questioner must be 
able to grasp the referent of “That red car.” The questioner cannot grasp the referent of “The 
car that belongs to X” but can grasp the referent of “That red car.” This difference is derived 
from the difference in the semantic content of “The car that belongs to X” and “That red car.”
What is the difference in the semantic content? Why is it that the questioner cannot grasp 
the referent of “The car that belongs to X” despite understanding its semantic content? Why 
can the answerer not only understand the semantic content of “The car that belongs to X” 
but also grasp its referent? To grasp the referent of “The car that belongs to X” one needs 
to understand more than its semantic content. The questioner knows the referent of “X” and 
understands the semantic content of the general noun “car” and verb phrase “belong to”. 
However, such knowledge is not enough to specify which car in the parking lot belongs 
to X. The answerer is able to answer this question because she had seen X’s car and could 
recognize it based on her memory. “The car that belongs to X” is a definite description that 
fits only one object in the parking lot. The questioner needs such an expression to convey the 
object to which he wants the answerer to refer. 
The semantic content of a definite description expresses the information that fits only its 
referent. But this information is neither sufficient nor necessary to grasp the referent. It is not 
sufficient because even someone who knows the information could not grasp the referent in 
instances such as this example. It is not necessary because the object in this example can be 
referenced by another expression, such as, “That Honda car” instead of “That red car.” Also, 
understanding the semantic content of “That red car” is neither sufficient nor necessary to 
grasp its referent. It is necessary to add something to the semantic content contained in “That 
red car.” In other words, we need information about the situation or context in which the 
expression is uttered.
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(3)  Distinctions between true and sufficient answers presuppose distinctions between 
semantic content and referents.
How should an answer be formed? When the answerer replies, “That red car,” the answerer 
must assume that the questioner can understand the semantic content of “That red car” and 
also grasp its referent. If the questioner could not grasp the referent, “That red car” would not 
be a sufficient answer — irrespective of its truth value. To be a true answer is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the answer to be valid. To be a sufficient answer, the questioner 
must be able to grasp its referent.
For example, when the answer is, “That Honda,” the answerer assumes that the 
questioner can grasp the referent, “That Honda.” If the questioner cannot grasp the referent, 
“That Honda,” this answer is not sufficient for the questioner, even if the answer were true.
Let us summarize. When a question and answer in the forms of “A = ?” and “B” are 
uttered, the following propositions hold:
• The questioner understands the semantic content of “A” but cannot reach its referent. 
•  The questioner supposes that an answerer can understand the semantic content of “A” 
and can grasp its referent.
• The answerer knows the semantic content and the referents of “A” and “B”.
•  The answerer supposes that the questioner can understand the semantic content of “B” 
and grasp its referent.
•  The questioner can understand the semantic content of “B” and grasp its referent.
This means that the semantic content and the referent of a subsentential expression are 
distinct; this distinction is made explicit in the relationship between the question and the 
answer as follows.
(1)  The questioner and the answerer know the semantic content of “A”, but the 
questioner cannot grasp its referent and the answerer can grasp it.
(2) The questioner cannot grasp the referent of “A” but can grasp the referent of “B”.
Frege explains the meaning of a proper name as the way in which a referent is given. We 
can explain it more explicitly here. The meaning of a singular term is constituted by the 
information about the properties that belong only to the referent. However, this information 
is neither sufficient nor necessary for specifying the referent. 
The identity of/difference between the semantic content of coreferential singular terms 
can be expressed in the following two ways. First, it can be expressed by the identity of/
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difference between the properties of coreferential singular terms, which belong only to the 
referent. Second, it can be expressed by the identity of/difference between the information 
needed to grap its referent. The former directly concerns the semantic content, and the 
latter concerns the additional necessary information. The semantic content of a singular 
term is not sufficient to grasp its referent; therefore, additional information or knowledge is 
necessary to grasp it. Such additional information differs according to the different semantic 
content of coreferential singular terms. Therefore, the difference of such additional necessary 
information expresses the difference in semantic content.
4 Meaning of identity sentences
What is the meaning of an identity sentence that is constructed by a question and an answer? 
We will consider this issue from the perspective of inferential semantic theory and then from 
the perspective of questions and answers.
(1) Inferential roles of identity sentences
Inferential semantics explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their 
inferential roles. The foundation of this notion is Gentzen’s claim that meanings of logical 
connectives can be explained by introduction and elimination rules. M. Dummett and R. 
Brandom expanded this idea to ordinary language, explaining the meanings of a sentence in 
terms of the upstream inferences that render the sentence a conclusion of such inferences and 
in terms of the downstream inferences that treat the sentence as the premise.7 For example, “p, 
q, r    s” is an upstream inference of “s” and a downstream inference of “p”. 
When we explain the meaning of an identity sentence according to inferential semantics 
we need to explain the following:
(a) The introduction and elimination rules of the relationship “ = ”.
(b)  The upstream and downstream inferences of the identity sentence in the form of 
“a = b”.
(a) Introduction and elimination rules of the relationship “ = ”
The introduction and elimination rules of the identity relation “ = ” are as follows.
The introduction rule of “ = ”: a = b     F (Fa ≡ Fb (principle of the indiscernibility 
7 Cf. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London, 1991, Chap. 11 and R. Brandom, Making 
It Explicit, Harvard UP, 1994, Chap. 2, and Articulating Reasons, Harvard UP, 2000. Chap. 1.  
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of identicals).
The elimination rule of “ = ”:   F (Fa ≡ Fb)    a = b (principle of the identity of the 
indiscernibles).
The meaning of the symbol of identity is constituted by its use, and the way it is used is 
sufficiently explained by the introduction rule and the elimination rule.8
(b) Upstream and downstream inferences of the identity sentence in the form of “a = b”
First, let us consider the upstream inference of “a = b”. The following are upstream inferences 
of “a = b”: 
p   p  a = b    a = b
a = b  p    a = b
The identity sentence “a = b” is contained not only in the conclusion but also in the premises 
of these two inferences; therefore, these upstream inferences are not available to contribute 
to understanding “a = b” because these inferential relations are almost the same as the 
inferential relations of “p   p  q    q”   q  p    q,” which are given by substituting “p” into 
the “a = b” of the above inferences. To be available, the upstream inference cannot contain 
“a = b” in its premises. Thus, the following inferences would be available:
 F (Fa ≡ Fb)    a = b
a = m, b = m    a = b.
The former can explain the form of “a = b”, but it cannot explain the meaning of “a = b” 
because “  F (Fc ≡ Fd)    c = d” can also hold; therefore, we cannot explain the difference 
between “a = b” and “c = d”.
In contrast, the latter cannot explain the sentence form “a = b” because understanding the 
premises “a = m” and “b = m” requires presupposing an understanding of the sentence form 
“a = b”.
However, this type of upstream inference can explain the difference between “a = b” 
and “c = d”, because the difference between the referent of “a = b” and that of “c = d” can be 
explained by the upstream inferences “a = m, b = m    a = b” and “c = n, d = n    c = d”.
8 These two rules must have ‘harmony’ (Nuel Belnap); that is, after applying the introduction rule and 
the elimination rule, we lack an inference that has not been accepted by only the old vocabulary. Cf. 
Nuel Belnap, ‘Tonk, Plonk, and Plink,’ Analysis 22 (1962): 130-134.
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Second, let us consider the downstream inferences. The following are the downstream 
inferences of “a = b”:
a = b, p    a = b  p
a = b    a = b  p.
The identity sentence “a = b” is contained not only in the premises but also in the conclusion 
of these two inferences; therefore, these downstream inferences are not available to aid in the 
understanding of “a = b”. However, the downstream inference that does not contain “a = b” 
in its conclusion is available. Thus, the following two inferences are useful:
a = b     F (Fa ≡ Fb)
a = m   b = m    a = b.
The former can explain the form of “a = b”, but it cannot explain the meaning of “a = b” 
because this type of inference cannot explain the difference between the referent of “a = b” 
and that of “c = d”. In contrast, the latter cannot explain the sentence form of “a = b” because 
it contains “a = b” in its conclusion. However, this downstream inference can explain the 
meaning of “a = b” because the difference between the referent of “a = b” and that of “c = d” 
can be explained by the difference between the following two downstream inferences: “a = m, 
b = m    a = b” and “c = n, d = n    c = d”.
The inferential semantics explains the meaning of an identity sentence by upstream and 
downstream inferences in the way shown above. Interestingly, the inferences can hold as a 
process by which to answer a question; therefore, we should understand the meaning of a 
sentence in terms of the question-answer relationship.9 
(2) From inferential role to role in the question-answer relationship
Inference constitutes the process by which a question is answered. For example, in the 
inference “a = c, b = c    a = b”, these two premises can logically lead to conclusions 
other than “a = b”: for example, “a = d  b = d” and “a ≠ d  b ≠ d” could be conclusions. 
Nevertheless, “a = b” was selected as the conclusion because “a = b” can become an answer 
to a question such as “a = ?”.
Let us suppose that when the question is asked, “Which car belongs to X?” in the parking 
9 Yukio Irie, ‘Question and Inference,’ in Begegnungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Claudia 
Rammelt, Cornelia Schlarb, Egbert Schlarb (HG.), Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf Berlin, Juni, 2015. pp. 365-
375.
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lot, the person asked remembers that the car that belongs to X = the Honda I have seen 
before, and finds that the Honda I have seen before = that red car. So she made the following 
inference,
 The car that belongs to X = the Honda I have seen before
 The Honda I have seen before = that red car
 The car that belongs to X = that red car
We can deduce many other conclusions from these two premises, such as “I have seen that 
red car before”, or “The Honda car belongs to X and it is red”, and so on. She needed to 
select “The car that belongs to X = that red car” because she must answer the question “Which 
car belongs to X?” We should identify the sentence “The car that belongs to X = that red car” 
not only in the inferential relation but also in the question-answer relationship. 
(a) Identifying the meaning of a sentence in relation to plural questions 
The same sentence can serve as an answer to many different questions. Indeed, answering 
different questions involves drawing different inferences. It is also possible to get the same 
answer to the same question via different inferences. However, when we offer the same 
sentence as an answer to different questions, we have necessarily drawn different inferences 
to reach each answer. The same sentence can have many correlative questions, and each 
correlative question requires that one uses a different inference to answer it.
Let us suppose that the utterance U1 is an answer to the correlative question Q1, and the 
set of possible answers of Q1 is the set {U1, U2, U3, …}. We cannot determine the meaning 
of U1 based only on its relationship to the correlative question Q1 because other possible 
answers to Q1 have the same relationship to Q1 as U1. Therefore, the relationship to the 
correlative question cannot reveal the differences in the meanings of possible answers.
On the other hand, the utterance U1 can have another question, Q2, as its correlative 
question. Let us suppose that the set of possible answers to Q2 consists of {U1, Ua, Ub, …}. 
The meaning of U1 is restricted by its relationship to Q2, but its relationship to Q2 is not 
a sufficient basis for determining the meaning of U1 because its relationship to Q2 cannot 
reveal the differences in the meanings of the possible answers to Q2.
However, if we combine these two correlative questions, we can determine the unique 
meaning of the sentence because the only term that belongs to the set of possible answers to 
Q1, {U1, U2, U3, …}, and to the set of possible answers to Q2, {U1, Ua, Ub, …}, is U1. Let 
us explain why two sentences cannot serve as possible answers to the two questions. 
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“Everyone ends up alone at the end of one’s life” (Chizuko Ueno)
The correlative question of this sentence varies according to the focus point.
Q1 “Who ends up alone at the end of one’s life?” 
 “[Everyone]F ends up alone at the end of one’s life.”
Q2 “When does everyone end up alone?” 
 “Everyone ends up alone [at the end of one’s life]F.”
An answer to Q1 has the following form: “… ends up alone at the end of one’s life,” and 
different possible answers involve replacing “….” with different noun phrases. An answer to 
Q2 has the form “Everyone ends up alone …,” and different possible answers have different 
replacement phrases for “…”. In this context, we can understand that there is only one 
possible answer to Q1 and Q2: “Everyone ends up alone at the end of one’s life.” Generally, 
when plural correlative questions are posed, the sentence that can serve as an answer to all 
correlative questions can be uniquely determined. Therefore, the meaning of a sentence can 
be defined by the set of possible correlative questions it can answer. This being the case, can 
we make the same claim regarding an identity sentence?
(b) Understanding identity sentences in terms of the question-answer relationship
An identity sentence (e.g., “A = B”) can have two different correlative questions. We 
understand “A = B” as an answer to “Which is A?” or as an answer to “Which is B?” The 
focus point of an identity sentence varies according to its correlative question. As an answer 
to the first question, “A = B” has the following focus points: “A = [B]F” and “A = B”; as an 
answer to the second question, it has the following focus point: “[A]F = B”. 
For example, the identity sentence “The wife of Socrates = Xanthippe” can answer the 
following two correlative questions: “Who is the wife of Socrates?” and “Who is Xanthippe?” 
Answers to these questions have the following different focus points: “The wife of Socrates 
= [Xanthippe]F” and “[The wife of Socrates]F = Xanthippe”. Therefore, the answers to these 
questions involve different inferences. The ways in which two questioners understand the 
identity sentence also differ. The questioner posing the first correlative question can grasp 
the referent of the wife of Socrates via the referent “Xanthippe”. The questioner posing the 
second correlative question can grasp the referent of “Xanthippe” via the referent “the wife 
of Socrates”. In both cases, the questioner knows the semantic content of one noun phrase but 
does not know its referent and also understands both the semantic content and the referent of 
the other noun phrase; however, there are different asymmetric relations in these two cases.
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Conclusion
We pointed out the following in the first half of this paper (in sections 1, 2, and 3):
• The learning of subsentential expressions starts with questions and answers.
•  Distinctions between a sentence and a subsential expression, between predicative 
expressions and other subsentential expressions, and between the semantic content 
and the referent of a noun phrase hold by virtue of the question-answer relationship, or 
these distinctions are the transcendental conditions of the question-answer relationship.
In the latter half (in section 4), we pointed out the following:
•  Inferential semantics explains the meaning of an identity sentence in terms of upstream 
and downstream inferences. We added that these inferences also hold as the process by 
which a question is answered.
•  The meaning of a sentence, including an identity sentence, is determined by its set of 
possible correlative questions.
•  The meaning of an identity sentence is understood as an answer to a correlative 
question. Therefore, we do not understand the noun phrases on the two sides of an 
identity sentence in a symmetric way; we understand them asymmetrically.
•  Each identity sentence can have many correlative questions, and the asymmetric 
understanding of each identity sentence varies along with its correlative questions.
Based on the above understanding, and in contrast to semantic atomism, we can claim that to 
understand a word is initially to understand the word as a subsentential expression. Against 
the claim that a sentence is a minimal unit of linguistic meaning, we can point out that 
understanding a set of questions and answers is more basic than understanding a sentence. A 
speech act is performed not as an utterance of a sentence but as an answer to a question10.
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